The 
Introduction
Born in the United States for acute care inpatient utilisation review in the early 1970s (Fetter et al. 1980, pp 1-53) , the diagnosis related group (DRG)/casemix methodology has been transplanted across geographical, institutional and conceptual boundaries. From the United States, the method was introduced into Europe, Australia and Asia. From acute care inpatient treatment, the method was transplanted to rehabilitation and nursing home care and has started slowly to be applied in ambulatory care. From the well-known prospective payment system used by the Health Care Financing Administration in the United States as an incentive to increased efficiency, the method is currently used, particularly in Europe and Australia, for the commonly shared goals of most health care systems -equity, efficiency and quality (Wiley 1992, pp 119-33) .
At the 11th PCS/E working conference in Oslo we outlined the equity and efficiency situation in France before the introduction of casemix funding for hospitals (TrombertPaviot et al. 1995) . The casemix-adjusted cost is now available for 1996 and 1997 for all public and private non-profit hospitals (1000 throughout France) and edited by the government (Coca 1998) . This paper presents a summary of the French DRG saga initiated in the early 1980s. It then outlines the main characteristics of the French health care reform of 1995-96 which have enabled the use of French DRGs for funding. The paper goes on to assess inequities and inefficiencies among French hospitals using DRGs. It concludes by addressing the present dilemma facing the French health care authorities with the availability and editing of casemix data.
The French DRG saga
In France Le Programme de Médicalisation du Système d'Information (PMSI) was developed from 1982. PMSI has followed the same four-phase schedule as all DRG projects in Europe (Rodrigues et al. 1988 ). These phases are as follows.
1. Assessing the technical feasibility of assigning DRG numbers to uniform hospital discharge abstracts databases.
This was achieved in France in 1983 and was the first national project in Europe at that time.
2. Evaluating whether the utilisation model defined by DRGs is adequate to fit the national hospital database, that is, whether or not relationships observed between length of stay and different variables (diagnosis, procedure, age discharge status) explain significant amounts of variability.
This was assessed in France in 1984.
3. Designing and implementing a cost accounting and budgeting model, taking into account actual and expected patient activity levels through both a DRG and national accounting and financial data framework.
This was achieved in two hospitals (Vienne and Annemasse Rhône-Alpes region) in 1984.
4. Implementing and developing software and information systems, including training for data collection, processing (assigning patients to DRGs and computing cost by DRG) and analysis on in-house microcomputers.
This started in France in 1986 with the French grouper software based on Health Care Financing Administration DRG version 3 (1985) . The initial version 0 (FG0) (1986) was updated very slightly in version 1 (FG1), with a specific major diagnostic category (CM 24) for the less than one-day stays; then in version 2 (FG2) with 462 Groupes Homogenes de Malades (GHM) for major diagnostic categories 1-23 and 51 GHM for CM 24; and version 3 (FG3) with very few differences. The first real and important shift has been decided for the fourth version (01/01/97) to an AP-DRG 12 like grouper named version 4 FG4 (Trombert-Paviot et al. 1997, pp 297-302) .
It is fair to acknowledge that PMSI, like most of the DRGs projects, was methodologically supported by the Yale University Health Services Management Group led by Professor Fetter.
Implementation of projects
Contrasting with the widespread extension of research on DRGs in the early 1980s and in France between 1982 and 1986, the implementation of DRG-based applications has been a slower phenomenon in Europe, particularly in France, where the first real comprehensive data production year was 1996 and the first utilisation for funding was in the fiscal year 1998.
Since 1997, acute care inpatient hospital budget allocations have been set partly on the basis of their DRG production: the hospital budget is based, on one hand, on the hospital-specific cost and, on the other hand, on an adjustment based on the regional casemix index mean (named ISA -Index Synthétique d'Activité) of the cost per case. We have explained the computation elsewhere (Freeman et al. 1986, pp 38-57) .
What was done during these years, mainly between 1986 and 1994 when the government decided that sending hospital DRG statistics to the regional agency of the government was mandatory, can be analysed in different ways -lack of health care policy, lack of leadership, the contradictory role of lobbies, underestimation of training needs of the different actors, resistance to change, French acceptance of very equitable 'service public à la française', and so on.
French health care reform
An important health care reform was approved by the French Government and the parliament during the first semester of 1996 and implementation started in 1997. The main features are as follows (Rodrigues 1996) .
• Progressively implementing a universal health insurance system funded by a process monitored by an annual parliamentary Act based on regional population needs.
• Carrying out a population needs assessment on a regional basis and introducing the goal of equity for resource allocation between regions.
• Introducing comprehensive regional hospital system management by merging the two hospital sub-systems of public and private, with only one organisation, the Agence Régionale de l'Hospitalisation (ARH), making decisions.
• Extending medical information systems (DRGs for all types of hospitals, coded minimum data sets for ambulatory care, electronic networking between health services using microprocessor health care card systems).
• Making accreditation and quality of care assessment mandatory.
• Using medical information systems, accreditation certificates and quality of care assessment for any decision in planning, contracting and funding.
• Introducing cost containment procedures for fee-for-service ambulatory care private physician payments.
• Experimenting with new health care delivery organisations (such as managed care, GP gatekeeper).
Progressive implementation of a universal health insurance system
This is the most basic modification of the system. The new system required a modification of the constitution to allow the annual vote by the parliament of a budget as for all government departments (the former system was by law an insurance system without limitation for spending; in effect, a bottomless system). This Act is based on population needs to determine the spending by region and by different sectors of health care (hospitals, ambulatory care).
The revenue source has shifted in two years from a wages-based premium to an income tax.
Population needs assessment
Several authors have illustrated many inequities between French regions and hospitals. Until the reform, these known inequities were not considered by decision-makers.
The epidemiological needs of the population now must be assessed annually at the regional and national levels. This has been written for the first time in a French law.
Comprehensive hospital system management
A new regional (22 for mainland France) state government agency, the Agence Régionale de l'Hospitalisation (ARH), manages (planning, contracting and funding) the two hospital sub-systems (public and private-for-profit) with the same goal of efficiency by a procedure of 'melting'.
While this comprehensive management is based on population needs and regional epidemiological statistics, it is mainly based on the DRG/GHM information system available since 1996 for all public hospitals and extended from 1 February 1997 to acute care private for-profit hospitals -and planned in the coming years for mid-term and long-term care and for mental care.
Mandatory accreditation and quality of care assessment
The new system is introducing a mandatory accreditation for all hospitals every five years and evaluation based on compliance with clinical protocol standards approved by a new national public agency, the Agence Nationale d'Accréditation et d'Evaluation de Santé (ANAES), which is organised to be a professionally independent institution.
Normalisation of the use of medical information systems
This is the logical consequence of the other features.
All the decisions for planning, contracting and funding will be based on population needs assessment, DRG systems, accreditation certificates and quality of care assessment. ARHs receive all the medical information from the hospitals.
Experimentation with new health care delivery organisations
Experimentation with new health care delivery organisations such as managed care and a GP gatekeeper system show how the episode-based information system is becoming an important issue for the French health care system.
DRGs and inequity among French hospitals

Inequity between French regions
Figures 1 and 2 show that 3 regions have a regional mean above the national mean, but␣ 2 of these regions are little islands (Corsica and Réunion Island) and only 1 region (Île de France) has an important supply and spending size; 5 regions are very near the national mean (Rhône-Alpes, Provence, Midi-Pyrénées, Basse-Normandie, Alsace); and 15 to 23 regions are well under the national mean.
The Île de France region is capturing too much money and is inefficient, not only with its five university hospitals (discounted 13% for their cost for training and research activities) but with the 60 non-university hospitals as shown in Table 1 .
Inequity within French regions
Concerning the intra-region differences, 6 regions have differences from 1 to 2 and 2␣ regions have differences around 1 to 2.5.
At the national level the differences range from 1 to more than 3 ( Figure 1 ).
The Rhône-Alpes region is given as an example in Tables 2, 3 and 4, showing an overfunding of 10% or around 500 000 000 French francs for Lyon University hospital and an underfunding of 10% or around 100 000 000 French francs for Saint Etienne University hospital. 
Population needs cannot account for the results
Figures 3 and 4 show that there is no statistical relationship between the mortality ratio by region and the total cost per inhabitant supported by the health insurance system. Île de France, with the lowest mortality ratio, is among the regions with the highest cost per inhabitant ratio and most of the French regions with a higher mortality ratio have a lower cost per inhabitant ratio.
The inequity between the French regions is not population needs adjusted.
Inequity and quality
An almost best-seller guide to hospitals, Le Guide des Hôspitaux, shows the first comparison of casemix-adjusted mortality in France available to the public. The mapping of the inequities in funding increases the challenges facing the French health care system. 
Conclusion
These partly predictable results have had rather reduced effects for the first two years. The first redistribution was done between Île de France and the five most deprived regions for a small percentage of the 650-billion French francs health care budget.
Within regions, the hospitals with a cost by ISA above the regional mean have lost 1%␣ of their budget. This amount has been distributed between the hospitals with a cost by ISA ranking them under the median, provoking much reaction from the losers.
Such important differences are creating political turbulence in many places. For instance, among the 60 non-university hospitals of Île de France, 59 are more casemix-adjusted funded than half of the French university hospitals outside Île de France.
The inequities correction needs to decrease the supply and staff in Île de France (not only in the famous University Hospital of Paris) and in some famous university hospitals outside Île de France, and to increase them in most hospitals of most mainland French␣ regions.
The DRG information system is now the most commonly used measurement unit within the French health care system. It is showing that the main goal of the French system following well accepted standards is to reduce inequities and inefficiencies. This main goal still needs to be formally approved by the actors to play a major role in the health care process re-engineering and in the strategy to change the existing French health care␣ system. Le guide des Hôpitaux 1998, Le Pré aux Clercs, Tours.
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Before commenting on some aspects of Jean-Marie's paper, I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this symposium in honour of George Palmer. When I began working on hospital cost analysis in the latter part of the 1970s, there were only a few people in Australia who had an appreciation of what economists were trying to achieve in applying econometric methods to the analysis of hospital costs. John Deeble was one of them, having published a paper in Medical Care in the 1960s analysing hospital costs in Victoria (Deeble 1965) . George Palmer was another. His quantitative economic background, together with his interest in the health sector, gave him a deep understanding of the issues involved in statistical analysis of hospital costs. I was, then, delighted to find (after the event) that George had been an examiner of my PhD thesis on this subject -and, I must confess, even more delighted to find that he had given me the right result! It is also a pleasure to participate in a symposium dealing with issues of casemix, hospital costs, hospital payment schemes and health policy. In an era when the methods of economic evaluation and their application command a lot of attention from health economists, it is refreshing to listen to, and learn from, the papers being presented and discussed here today dealing with subject matter other than economic evaluation. Hospitals generally consume a sizeable proportion of health expenditure, and the measurement of their efficiency is an important item on the agenda of health economists.
Turning to Jean-Marie's paper, I would like to highlight a couple of features in his piece that caught my attention. The first is that interest in diagnosis related groups (DRGs) in France has been evolving slowly. This is not due to France being a 'late adopter' of DRGs as a basis for classifying and measuring hospital output. In fact, as Jean-Marie has told us, the first attempt to assign DRG codes to hospital discharges in France occurred in the early 1980s. This was, in fact, early in the history of the development of DRGs. Recall that the late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of great ferment in hospital output measurement and hospital cost analysis. A number of scholars were grappling with the problem of how to measure hospital output using a casemix classification scheme to reduce hospital output categories to a manageable number while at the same time keeping within-group variation in lengths of stay and cost within reasonable bounds. The AUTOGRP variance reduction algorithm, subsequently used in the formation of the DRGs, first appeared in the literature in the mid-1970s (Mills et al. 1976) , while a special supplement to Medical Care in 1980 contained a detailed discussion of the concept of DRGs and their derivation . France was, then, an early entrant in the field of DRG experimentation. But following these early experiments, developments fell into a 'black hole' (to use Jean-Marie's description in his presentation), with the result that the use of DRGs in hospital financing did not appear in France until 1997. At that time, financing arrangements changed so that a hospital's budget was determined partially by a hospital's DRG profile and standard DRG costs, and partially by its own specific costs.
A second point I found particularly interesting is that the introduction of DRG financing of hospitals in France is taking place within a much more wide-ranging reform of health care financing in that country. Specifically, a system of universal health insurance was also implemented in 1997, the introduction of which required constitutional change. This is large-scale system reform and requires considerable political, administrative and economic will to succeed, as I'm sure the 'architects' of Australia's national health insurance scheme -Dick Scotton and John Deeble -found some 30 years ago. In addition to implementing a universal health insurance system, the regional distribution of funds in France is to be determined on the basis of population needs assessment, with equity being specified as a goal in determining interregional resource allocation. The concept of equity, of course, requires further definition if it is to be made operational, but it also raises the issue of how conflicts between equity (however defined) and efficiency are to be managed. I will return to this point shortly.
A third point that attracted my attention is that the universal health insurance scheme in France is to embrace inpatient treatment in both public and private hospitals. This is interesting to hear as Australia proceeds down the path of subsidising private hospital treatment indirectly through subsidies to private health insurance, rather than subsidising private hospital treatment directly. Further details on how the French system is dealing with this issue would be welcome.
Finally, returning to a point raised above, the introduction of DRG hospital financing alongside regional allocations of funds based on needs raises the spectre of the equityefficiency tradeoff, or 'The Big Tradeoff ', to use Arthur Okun's term (Okun 1975) . In the past, hospitals were commonly regarded as part of the social welfare system. In the words of Paul Starr (1982, p 145) : 'From their earliest origins in preindustrial societies, hospitals had been primarily religious and charitable institutions for tending the sick, rather than medical institutions for their cure'. The development of medical science has changed that, and alongside that development has been the growth of economic science and its application to the analysis of hospital costs and output. It could be argued that the classification of hospital output using DRGs, and the funding of hospitals partly or wholly according to their DRG casemix, represents the capstone of these developments. The case for DRG-based financing of hospitals undoubtedly rests on the incentives it provides for improvements in technical and productive efficiency, rewarding as it does the 'low-cost' hospitals at the expense of 'high-cost' hospitals. These implications of DRG financing are nicely demonstrated in Jean-Marie's paper.
But how does efficiency-based DRG financing sit with respect to the attainment of equity objectives? To be sure, some would argue that DRG financing is 'equitable' with respect to the relative treatment of hospitals. After all, is it not 'fair' that inefficient hospitals should be penalised and efficient hospitals rewarded? But in a broader equity framework, would DRG funding of hospitals always result in a redistribution of funds towards those regions in greater 'need', for example, to those regions with higher agesex standardised mortality rates? In some circumstances, of course, one or more regions may have relatively high-cost hospitals and relatively low mortality rates, so that a redistribution of funds away from those regions may satisfy both equity and efficiency objectives (the Ile de France region is a case in point). In these cases, the public policy prescriptions are easier to devise. However, when efficiency and equity objectives conflict, there is no escaping The Big Tradeoff.
Jean-Marie's paper gives us a very useful overview of recent developments in health care financing in France, and illustrates some of the implications of DRG financing for the French regions. It whets our appetite for more knowledge in a number of areas of French health care financing reform, and I look forward to reading more of his writings on this subject in the future.
